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Contextual Factors Among Indiscriminate or Large
Attacks on Food or Water Supplies, 1946-2015
Julii Brainard and Paul R. Hunter
This research updates previous inventories of malicious attacks on food and water and includes data from 1946 through
mid-2015. A systematic search of news reports, databases, and previous inventories of poisoning events was undertaken.
Incidents that threatened or were intended to achieve direct harm to humans and that were either relatively large (more than
4 victims) or indiscriminate in intent or realization were included. Agents could be chemical, biological, or radionuclear.
Reports of candidate incidents were subjected to systematic inclusion and exclusion criteria as well as validity analysis (not
always clearly undertaken in previous inventories of such attacks). We summarize contextual aspects of the attacks that may
be important for scenario prioritization, modelling, and defensive preparedness. Opportunity, and particularly access to
dangerous agents, is key to most realized attacks. The most common motives and relative success rate in causing harm were
very different between food and water attacks. The likelihood that people were made ill or died also varied by food or water
mode and according to motive and opportunity for delivery of the hazardous agent. Deaths and illness associated with
attacks during foodmanufacture and prior to sale have been fewer than those in some other contexts. Valuable opportunities
for food defense improvements are identified in other contexts, especially food prepared in private or community settings.
Interest in food and water security has led tocomprehensive inventories being generated in the past
20 years, to identify common factors in previous attacks
that employed biological, chemical, or radionuclear agents.
The most recent previous comprehensive inventory was
completed in 2008.1 Previous inventories identified agents
and types of food or water supplies attacked (useful for
scenario modeling), and commonly reported summary
statistics about location, total number of cases, type of food
or water supply, and type of agent.1-3 Pressing vulner-
abilities and risks facing water supply have been dis-
cussed,4,5 while Purver tried to summarize likely motives,
organizations, and agents in future terrorist attacks.3
Mohtadi and Murshid used extreme value theory to predict
that future events would be more frequent and affect more
people.6 Multifaceted aspects of preparedness against ter-
rorist attacks, or lack thereof, have been discussed as part of
the inventories of previous events, usually in the context of
the powers given to regulatory bodies and overall optimal
national government strategy.3,7
This article updates the previous inventories of food and
water attacks to include data through mid-2015. Reports of
candidate incidents were subjected to systematic inclusion
and exclusion criteria as well as validity analysis (not always
clearly undertaken in previous reports). We report on
contextual aspects of the attacks that may be important for
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scenario prioritization, modeling, and disaster preparedness
but that have not been identified previously. In particular,
the types of opportunities or motives most often associated
with threat or deaths are identified, and possible protection
measures are discussed.
Methods
Search Strategy
Wherever possible, scientific articles, court reports, and pri-
mary source news reports were sought and preferred for ci-
tation of individual incidents rather than reviews or inventory
documents, but some original reports were unavailable.
General searches for scientific articles (using PubMed and
Scopus) were undertaken. We used the search terms inten-
tional poisoning or deliberate poisoning in the title field, and the
following search string (OVID gateway): ((food* or wa-
ter*).tw. or exp water/ or exp ice/ or exp beverages/ or exp food/ or
exp drink/) and (poison* or contaminat* or attack)).tw. Almost
no eligible reports were found using these search phrases.
Searching without the title words (.tw.) restriction led to a
large number (many thousands) of mostly irrelevant hits,
which we lacked the resources to screen for eligibility. How-
ever, using details extracted on agent and location from news
accounts and other sources found via other search strategies
(see below and data extraction section), we again searched
PubMed and Scopus for scientific reports on individual in-
cidents and found some case reports not cited elsewhere.
Because relatively few attacks on food or water supplies
are described in scientific (peer-reviewed) literature, to in-
ventory such incidents from unclassified data in the inclu-
sive dates 1946 to July 23, 2015, we employed search
methods and accessed sources as follows.
An internet search engine was used to find books
(Google Books), grey literature (all Google databases), news
media reports (Google News), and scholarly articles
(Google Scholar) that matched English language search
terms below (Figure 1). The phrases in Figure 1 were
chosen considering the articles found after scoping searches
using the simpler phrases food attack and water attack. The
first 4 pages of search results (80 hits) were screened for
eligible incidents or documents that inventoried deliberate
poisoning incidents. News media reports were searched
both with no date limits and again specifically for publi-
cation in individual single years in the period 2004 to 2015
(the period most weakly covered by previous inventories of
food and water attacks). Reports that were inventories of
previous attacks on food and/or water, and meant to be
comprehensive within their stated eligibility criteria, were
hand-checked for references to further inventories, relevant
databases, and individual incident reports. These invento-
ries and any specific databases that they cited (see supple-
mental file S1 at www.liebertonline.com/hs) were searched
for eligible attacks within our date limits.
Eligibility
This inventory is for events that were indiscriminate in
intention or realization or that affected a relatively large
number (more than 4) of specific targeted individuals. The
rationale for omitting smaller events is to exclude many
events that were very limited in scope, impact, or public
health response. Closely linked small attacks, such as a se-
ries of single poisonings by 1 individual or that resulted
from the coordinated actions of 2 or more people, were
grouped and treated as a single incident with regard to
eligibility criteria and summary statistics.
Adult suicides were not eligible, but poisoning of groups
(more than 4) of targeted children (under 16 years old) as
part of group suicide events were treated as murder and
therefore eligible.
Events from January 1, 1946, through July 23, 2015,
were included. There were no geographical restrictions.
Fluent speakers were consulted or translation software was
used where reports were not available in English.
The event had to feature deliberate adulteration of food,
beverage, or water items, with intention (real or threatened)
to cause harm to other humans. Throughout this article we
use the term food as an umbrella term that also includes
beverages and any other edible substance that is not a source
for plain potable water. Deliberate attack (rather than
causing harm by negligence) must have been specified by
police, government bodies, identified witnesses, or a cred-
ible party. Exposure to a poisonous agent via inhalation,
injection, or other non–oral ingestion means was not eli-
gible, even when linked to an event that involved poisoning
via food or water.
Figure 1. Phrases and Terms Used in Internet Searches. Alternatives are indicated by slashes. For instance,
‘‘Rat poison murder/threat’’ means both phrases ‘‘rat poison murder’’ and ‘‘rat poison threat’’ were put into
the internet search engine.
Food/water bioterrorism/attacks/terrorism/threat
Deliberate/intentional food/water contamination/poisoning
Infant milk poisoning
Microbiological/chemical attacks food/water
Rat poison murder/threat
Supermarket/food extortion/threat
Well poisoning/contamination
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An unrealized but threatened attack must have evidence of
intent to be perceived as a genuine threat. Thus, we excluded
candidate threats that were mere rumors, an isolated single
threat with no specifics of means or target, or an individual
stating general interest in the mechanics of poisoning people.
Examples of threats accepted as expressing genuine intent (at
least at the point when the threat was issued) were: widely
published claims of responsibility, threats made with specifics
of reason why, and method or evidence of a criminal inves-
tigation to verify that a plot existed.
Agents included any substance that could in theory be
dissolved (invisible to the naked eye) into the target food,
drink, or water source. Thus, biological, chemical, and
radionuclear agents were included, as could be very finely
powdered physical agents such as ground glass or metals, as
long as the reason for the adulteration was intention to
cause harm to humans.
Data Extraction
Extracted data were bibliographic details of source docu-
ment(s), location(s) anddate of attack(s), type of foodorwater
supply attacked, contaminant, person(s) responsible with
motives, intended target(s), numbers ill or killed, and public
health or criminal investigation response and outcomes.
Validity Analysis
Validity questions are shown in Figure 2 andwere intended to
evaluate the strength of evidence that confirms eligibility
criteria for each alleged incident rather than validating indi-
vidual sources about each event. ‘‘Yes’’ answers were preferred
for each question. A score was assigned to each incident
based on the validity assessment for reports about that event,
with scores of No= –1, unclear or partly/not applicable= 0,
and Yes= 1. The question of whether a conviction or indict-
ment was documented scored 2 for a Yes answer, because this
aspect of validity, whether harm was intended, was often the
most uncertain of our validity questions.
Scores for all validity questions were summed to give a
combined score for the strength of evidence for each event.
Themaximum theoretical score was 8; theminimumpossible
theoretical score was -7. Where an event scored 5+, it was
deemed to be a highly credible food or water attack. Scores of
3 or 4 were interpreted as a credible event. Scores from 0 to 2
(inclusive) were considered to be an event withweak evidence;
usually, some but not all aspects of eligibility were well con-
firmed. Items with scores below 0 were interpreted to have
poor evidence of credibility, which again is more often due to
lack of evidence than poor quality of evidence.
Results
Nine previous large inventories of poisoning attacks on
water or food were found.1-9 Together they indicated a Fi
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large number of source databases to search (listed in sup-
plemental file S1). All incident reports were checked for our
inclusion and exclusion criteria, using original news or
scientific reports wherever possible rather than information
in a review. Our full inventory of eligible food and water
attacks is available as supplemental data (see S2,
www.liebertonline.com/hs).
Water
We found 84 incidents of actual or threatened water supply
poisoning: 21 (25%) reports were in Europe, 22 (26%) in
the United States, 4 (4.8%) were elsewhere in the Americas,
10 (12%) in the Middle East, and 8 (9.5%) in Africa, with
the remainder occurring in other parts of the world. Spe-
cific agents used in water attacks are listed in Table 1. The
nature of the agent tends to be vaguer in water attacks than
in food events and was not clearly specified in 23 incidents
(27%). Chemical agents dominate both in number of im-
plicated attacks and associated deaths or illness.
Fifty-five events (65%) were attacks against community
drinking water; 8 (9.5%) were attacks on drinking supplies
for police, military, or refugees; and 17 (20%) incidents
involved targeting of other limited groups (such as neigh-
bors, children in a nursery, or workers in a specific office).
Five attacks were on bottled water. Primary motives were
political (n = 45, 54% of incidents), unclear (n = 27, 32%),
financial (usually extortion, n = 5, 6%), labor disputes
(n = 3, 3.6%), or other (n = 5, 6%).
Threats Versus Realization
The impacts of the actual or threatened water poisoning
(whether anyone ingested the contaminant) were unclear in
8 (9.5%) incidents. There was no evidence of an actual plan
or attempt to contaminate water in 23 of the 84 (27%)
incidents: These seemed to be threats only (most often for
financial extortion). Of the 84 possible water attacks, 41
(49%) were clearly unsuccessful (no ingestion). Of 35
clearly realized attacks (where someone drank contami-
nated water), only 2 occurred after explicit warnings (both
extortion attempts).
Illness from ingestion but without deaths was a feature of
18 incidents, while actual deaths from ingestion were re-
ported in 7 incidents (8.3%). The number of deaths in fatal
attacks was fewer than 6 persons in 5 of these incidents.
However, 19 people died when poisoned water (and con-
fectionary) were given to police recruits in the Philippines
in 1987 for unknown reasons,5,6 and more than 200 people
are believed to have died in a series of attacks on commu-
nity water supplies, alleged to be politically motivated and
perpetuated by the Rhodesian government against in-
surgent communities in 1978 to 1980.10
Compared to food attacks (see subsequent discussion),
water attacks are much more likely to be linked to violent
political objectives, and this is especially true for realized
attacks: 54% of all attacks had political motives, while 26%
(9/35) of the realized water attacks occurred in places ex-
periencing armed conflict.
Food
A total of 224 food attacks were found: 53 (24%) reports
described poisoning events in the United States or Canada,
44 (19.6%) were in the People’s Republic of China, 20
(8.9%) from elsewhere in the Far East, 8.9% in the Middle
East, 23 (10.3%) in the UK, 25 (11.6%) elsewhere in
Europe, and the remainder were in other parts of the world.
The most common motives were unclear (n = 57, 25% of
events), financial extortion (n = 49, 22%), other financial
(n = 22, 10%), political (n = 36, 16%), personal malice
(n = 20, 9%), part of labor disputes (n = 11, 5%), and other
(n = 27, 12%). A total of 1,171 deaths were confirmed from
deliberate food poisoning in this inventory of (larger and
indiscriminate) events. The motive of extortion led to just 1
death from food poisoning attacks in this inventory, while
personal malice and business rival motives led to 48 and 49
deaths, respectively (combined they equal 8.2% of total
deaths). Political motivations were responsible for 316
(27%) deaths, but the largest group by far were deaths
associated with coercion and murder at mass (religious cult)
suicide events, which accounted for at least 509 involuntary
deaths (43.5% of total). Motives were unclear in 132
(11.3%) deaths, while other identified motives were linked
to 116 (9.9%) deaths.
Agents used in food attacks are listed in Table 1. The vast
majority of agents were purely chemical (n = 180, 80.3% of
all food attacks, and n = 94, 73%, of 128 attacks in high-
income countries). Microbiological or radionuclear agents
featured in only 23 (10.3%) attacks. No deaths resulted
from radionuclear agents, but biological agents were asso-
ciated with about the same number of deaths as arsenic or
tetramine. The agent was unclear in 29 (13%) attacks on
food (many of these were unrealized threats, especially ex-
tortion). The totals in this breakdown are greater than
100% because combined chemical and biological agents
were implied in some attacks. Among chemical agents,
rodenticides were the most frequent (28% of all attacks),
and cyanide-based products specifically account for 9% of
attacks. Arsenic (5%), cleaning fluids (2%) and herbicides,
insecticides, or pesticides were also common.
Threats Versus Realization
The majority of attacks in the food attack inventory (140,
or 62%) were realized (someone ingested the harmful
substance). In 94% of the realized 140, there was no threat
warning issued beforehand. About a quarter of all 224 in-
cidents (n = 60, 27%) were merely threats without realiza-
tion; most of these were motivated by financial extortion.
Of attempts or plans without accompanying threats, 14
(6.2%) were discovered before anyone ingested the
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Table 1. Specific Agents Used in Water or Food Attacks, 1946-2015
Agent
No. of Total
Attacks
Most Common
Motive(s), (no. of attacks)
Linked Deaths,
Totala
Ill Survivors,
Totala
Agents in Water
Chemical
Arsenic 1 Unclear 0 5
Cyanide 5 Political (5) 5 2
Herbicide, pesticide, or insecticide 11 Unclear (5)
Political (4)
20 361
Other specific single or multiple agents 17 Unclear (8)
Political (4)
2 149
Mercury 5 Political (1)
Unclear (1)
0 0
Nerve gases (eg, VX) 3 Political (2) 0 5
Ricin 2 Multiple (1)
Labor dispute (1)
0 0
Microbiological
Cholera 2 Political (2) 0 Unclear
Dead bodies or feces 4 Political (3) 0 9
Other microbiological or organic contaminants 11 Political (6) 0 2
Radionuclear (plutonium) 1 Not financial extortion 0 0
Agents in Food
Chemical
Arsenic 11 Personal malice (3) Unclear (3) 309 842
Cleaning fluids 5 Extortion (2) 0 76
Cyanide-based 20 Extortion (6)
Unclear (6)
286 6
Herbicide, pesticide, or insecticide 26 Unclear (8)
Extortion (6)
10 3,138 b
Rodenticide (clearly tetramine) 15 Business rivals (6)
Unclear (5)
59 985
Strychnine, including in rodenticides 3 Unclear (2) 0 2
Rodenticide (all others, including thallium) 37 Unclear (11)
Personal malice (8)
103 1,096
Specific others or agents in multiple categories 41 Extortion (11)
Unclear (11), Political (7)
35 365
Prescription drugs 7 Unclear (3)
Personal Malice (2)
1 29
Ricin 2 Political (1)
Extortion (1)
0 0
Microbiological
HIV-AIDS 4 Extortion (4) 0 0
Other microbiological/ organic contaminant 13 Extortion (4)
Political (4)
0 912
Radionuclear (iodine-125) 1 Love-life related (1) 0 0
Totals add to <84 (water) and <224 (food) due to vaguely specified agents in many incidents.
aThese estimates of how many people were made ill by each type of agent are probably conservative, because total numbers of dead or ill were often unclearly specified,
although it is also likely that some deaths or illnesses were inaccurately linked to attacks. Reports were not specific about the number made ill in some attacks (n = 28 food,
n = 11 water).
b2,843 people in Japan were reported ill due to contamination in imported food from China in a single event (blamed on a disgruntled factory employee).11-15
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dangerous contaminant. The extent to which a threat or
plot was realized (whether anyone ingested the hazardous
substance) was unclear in 9 events (4% of total).
A large variety of foods were targeted and at all points in
the production chain, from field to factory to shop to
plate(s). Most (n = 61, 73% of 84) threats or plots (without
realization) were at points in manufacture or threats of
adulteration of items on shop shelves. Eleven (13.3%)
threats or plots (without realization) were targeted at res-
taurants or catered food. In contrast, most realized attacks
were on food items supplied and prepared by volunteers,
co-religionists, family, or catering staff (n = 78, 56%), and
this is also the context for the vast majority of deaths
(1,024, or 94% of total). After 1948, only 62 of 790 (7.8%
of all) deaths from food attacks were in the context of paid
preparation for ready-to-eat food (such as from a
restaurant1,6,11-21), as opposed to volunteer or community/
unpaid food preparation, and most (46 of 62) of these
deaths associated with paying for prepared food were linked
to business disputes in China.12-19
Validity Assessment
The quality of eligible reports was variable. Validity attri-
butes of reports did not differ substantially by type of target
(food or water), so the validity assessment of food and water
is discussed together. Eligibility of many incidents (n = 103,
46%) was confirmed by just 1 original report for most
water or food incidents, often translated from a non-
English language. The data from these incidents should be
interpreted with caution. This is because for incidents with
multiple source reports, it was common that some alleged
deliberate intent while others suggested negligence.
Included events had deliberate intention to cause harm
confirmed (or alleged) by police, military, or sovereign
government sources (97%); in the other 30 incidents (3%
of total), credible sources included medical professionals,
representatives of large companies, truth commissions, and
media statements by the would-be poisoners. A report of
confession, conviction, or indictment to confirm deliberate
intention to cause harm or threaten to cause harm was
found for only 104 (33.7%) food or water attacks. How-
ever, it seems likely that many indictments and convictions
are not widely reported, reflecting a bias in media coverage
about newsworthiness.
The dangerous agent was less likely to be clearly specified
in water attacks (29/84 = 35% of incidents) than food at-
tacks (42/224 events, 19%). This partly reflects less-
developed plots and threats that tend to be more associated
with water than food attacks. In contrast, type of water
supply tends to be very clearly stated in available reports
(just 1 incident where water source was poorly identified),
whereas the types of food attacked or threatened with
contamination is more often unclear (35/224 incidents).
Less than 9% of food or water attack events (27/308) had
unspecific information with regard to how many people
were made ill or killed (realized or threatened events). The
numbers of people affected (especially those only made ill)
sometimes varied between reports for understandable rea-
sons: Our sources were media stories about developing
events, mostly without medical confirmation of cause of
illness.
Overall, there was better confirmation about food at-
tacks than water attacks (see Table 2). Of reported food
attacks, 31.2% were highly credible, compared to just
8.3% of water incidents. Just 24 (10.7%) food attacks
were poorly confirmed, compared to 25 water events
(30% of all identified water attacks). The poorer validity
scores for water are partly because of the motives in-
volved: Most water attacks were vaguely specified extor-
tion attempts, and hence it was less likely that a specific
Table 2. Validity Scores
Interpretation Validity Score No. of Food Attacks No. of Water Attacks
Highly credible (7-5) 7 40 0
31.2% of food attacks 6 16 0
8.3% of water attacks 5 14 7
Credible (4-3)
26.3% of food attacks 4 37 0
25.0% of water attacks 3 22 21
Weakly confirmed (2-0) 2 31 10
31.7% of food attacks 1 27 9
36.9% of water attacks 0 13 12
Poorly confirmed (-1 to -3) -1 11 8
10.7% of food attacks -2 9 12
29.8% of water attacks -3 4 5
Summary Average scores= 3.16 for food
attacks 0.94 for water attacks
S= 224 S = 84
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agent was threatened or that the people responsible were
identified and convicted.
Discussion
Many types of food were targeted and at every point in the
production chain up to the moment of consumption.
Water poisoning events were much more indiscriminate in
intent and impact and much more likely to be politically
motivated than attacks on food. Water attacks are also
much less likely to be successful because of less specific
planning and the large volumes of agent required to have a
significant impact (due to heavy dilution).
Many threats were presented as genuine, but turned out
to be only threats, and it seems they did not feature true
desire to do harm to health; it is unusual that extortion
leads to illness or mortality. This may be a small consola-
tion to consumers but even less so to manufacturers and
retailers, for whom commercial security still means treating
every threat as genuine. Economic and environmental
damage from attacks without ingestion can also be very
high.2,4,22-33
When threatened harm was accompanied by an actual
plan of action, attacks were least successful that targeted raw
materials (the field), manufacturers, and retailers. This
probably reflects the high security standards that the food
production industry have embraced or have been required
to implement in recent decades, as described by many
standards documents or legislation (eg, BSI Standards
Ltd28 and FSMA34).
The choice of dangerous agent sometimes reflected a
‘‘faddish’’ interest in sensationalized contaminants or tra-
ditional notoriety, such as arsenic and cyanide over many
years, HIV-AIDS in the 1990s,2,35,36 or Ebola in 2014.37
Probable copycat attacks (threatened and realized) were also
identified in our inventory.38-45 Mostly, however, the
choice of agent seemed to be determined by availability
(eg, rodenticides in household products,13,46 or infectious
microbes among lab workers2,47), and most agents were
chemical in nature. Li and colleagues13 argued that limiting
public access to rodenticides had reduced the number of
attacks using rat poison in China. Biological agents tend to
be unusual, are more associated with threats than im-
plementation, and are not as effective when deployed.
Radionuclear agents were very uncommon in our inventory
(just 2 of all 308 water and food attacks).
The events associated with highest mortality (and pos-
sibly highest illness rates as well) tended to be associated
with political or religious motives (or both). Nonprofes-
sional catering for specific targeted groups was a feature of
the most successful attacks (ie, perpetuated by community
volunteers, family members, or co-religionists).
As important as it is to protect against and prepare for
malicious poisoning events, it is important to be aware that
deaths and illness from accidental poisonings have affected
many thousands more people than malicious deliberate
events in the 1946-2015 period.1,48 Widespread accidental
poisoning is also quite problematic because of the impli-
cations for identifying malicious poisoning events: Some
apparent accidents may in fact have been deliberate events,
masking true attacks.
Ideally, future research would include full analysis of the
effectiveness of public health response to malicious food
and poisoning events. Unfortunately, this is not yet prac-
tical because of the lack of published detailed and critical
assessments of the public health responses in this type of
event. Relatively few food or water attacks (n = 21) were at
least partially documented in peer-reviewed scientific lit-
erature. There was no consistent systematic analysis of
public health response in these publications, making it hard
to draw meaningful conclusions. Most of the scientific or
detailed reports concentrated on forensic investigation or
successful treatment approaches rather than giving detailed
accounts of public health actions to minimize further harm.
Published and focused assessments of health protection
failures in actual attacks are relatively rare (most are too
small to generate sufficient public interest) and otherwise
potentially sensitive (they could provide too much explicit
information to would-be attackers about vulnerabilities).
One public health observation that we can make with
confidence is that swift diagnosis of the causative agent is
very valuable (especially in the case of realized attacks).
Quick identification of the precise poison was credited for
saving lives,49 while delayed recognition has led to unnec-
essary alarm50 or greater uncertainty about who was ex-
posed and how.51,52 Early identification also supports
accurate, timely, and effective communication about any
possible wider threat to public health, which is very desir-
able following high-profile events.53,54
A strength of this report is in the rigor of inclusion and
exclusion criteria, as well as the systematic validity analysis.
Most previous inventories of food or water attacks did not
describe a systematic methodology for verifying all eligi-
bility criteria and did not (as clearly as we have) grade events
by credibility of supporting evidence. The cause of poi-
soning in food or water can be very unclear, and it is not
unusual in poisoning events for vehement accusations of
criminal intent to be made which are later determined to be
unfounded.1,55,56
Limitations
Like similar previous efforts, it is not possible for this in-
ventory to be perfectly complete. The quality of the evi-
dence to verify eligibility criteria was not ideal; usually only
1 original report was available, which was produced for
news media rather than scientific standards of evidence
verification. It is also very likely that many threatened at-
tacks on food and water are never reported in the public
domain and therefore are not part of this inventory, but
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they may be listed in classified databases or known to
specific private sector organizations.
A note of caution applies to our suggested links between
likely fatality of attacks and context or motives, because the
outcomes of some incidents (including fatalities) are often
uncertain and may have been poorly recorded. This espe-
cially applies to historical events with political sensitivity,
where adequate reporting may have been suppressed, such
as, for example, attacks by the Brazilian government on
indigenous populations from 1957 to 1965.2,57 In the
Brazilian incidents, sugar was adulterated with arsenic and
given to rural isolated communities among whom subse-
quent illness or fatalities were not recorded. Political mo-
tives were also implicated in claims10 that in 1978-1980 the
Rhodesian government distributed thallium-contaminated
meat to insurgents who then passed on the foodstuffs to
hungry civilians, and government employees attempted to
add cholera to water sources, with subsequent unknown
illness or deaths. The difficulties of determining true im-
pacts of food or water attacks associated with political
motives are partly the reason this inventory starts post–
World War II.
Our search phrases were only in English, and we did not
attempt to replicate the search in other languages. We fo-
cused mostly on deaths in our results, because death is easier
to confirm and link to attacks than episodes of illness, es-
pecially when illness is relatively mild. This narrow em-
phasis makes it possible to more clearly compare impacts
from different types of agent or opportunity, but it neglects
the importance of disabling illness.
We excluded smaller and purely targeted events so that
we could focus on those incidents that generate the greatest
public health response. Our interest was also in poisoning
via food or water and not by other means. These last 2
criteria meant that this study omits an exceptional poi-
soning incident in London, UK, in 2006,51,52 which gen-
erated an enormous public health response because of
suspected widespread environmental exposure to unin-
tended targets (while still lacking our eligibility criterion of
indiscriminate exposure via ingested food or water).
We did not analyze attacks by time or space: Other
inventories have undertaken geographic categorization1 or
trend analysis.6 Any spatial or temporal categorization or
even trend analysis for these types of events, given how
they tend to be documented, is subject to variable biases
depending on the public appetite for such news, govern-
ment policy about managing such information, news re-
porting infrastructure in the locality of the attack,
probability of events being described in English-language
reports, changes in monitoring or detection methods, and
information sharing habits among would-be perpetrators.
Therefore, it becomes difficult to make the data mean-
ingful with reference to time or space. Mohtadi and
Murshid6 attempted to overcome the underlying data
uncertainties using extreme value theory, concluding that
such attacks are becoming larger and more frequent. They
did not adjust for recent population growth. With regard
to the contextual factors explored in this article, brief as-
sessment suggests that the context of attacks (especially
types of targets, motives, moment of opportunity) in high-
income countries tended to be similar to attacks in low-
income countries. One of the few intercountry differences
we can observe is that attacks related to business rivalry are
much more likely to be reported in China than in other
countries.
Conclusions
Although the past cannot predict the future, our inventory
of past attacks suggests that most realized poisoning op-
portunities and deaths from such attacks are likely to be in
the context of catering for groups by family or other fellow
community members. In contrast, and without wishing to
endorse complacency, this inventory of past attacks sug-
gests that attacks are less successful when targeting man-
ufacturers or retailers. We cannot exclude the possibility
that commercial pressures have encouraged under-
reporting, but it is also likely that many manufacturers
and retailers have embraced mostly effective practices to
minimize the human health risks of deliberate malicious
contamination. A further useful security precaution could
be to implement vetting procedures and background
checks for volunteers preparing food, especially for larger
or high-risk target groups (eg, police, refugees, members
of religious minorities).
The small number of fatal cases resulting from publicly
threatened attacks on food or water is reassuring and sup-
ports common-practice reassurances to the public from
authorities, when such threats are first revealed, to take
reasonable precautions but not to be unduly alarmed,
precisely because past evidence indicates a low success rate
for such threats and plots.
It is problematic that a number of dangerous agents are
widely available. Limiting access to hazardous agents is ef-
fective in reducing the number of realized attacks (and may
have similar impacts on likelihood of threatened attacks).
Otherwise, given that food and water attacks may well re-
cur, swift and accurate identification of the toxic agent(s)
should be facilitated (with resources that health profes-
sionals find easy to consult) to achieve both effective
treatment and other harm reduction.
Scenarios to prepare public health responses to possible
attacks via food or water should consider diverse plausible
contexts in how the adulterated food or water is delivered
(in the home, at community events, etc), as well as the
likely available contaminants. Moreover, it seems prob-
able that the motive for attack as well as the nature of the
perpetrator (eg, government, individual, member of
ideologically driven group) and their motive(s) will often
influence the mode, true intent, magnitude, and agent of
attack.
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